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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FISH AND WILDLIFE RELATED 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CONDUCTED BY CONSERVATION 
AGENTS IN MISSOURI 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that searches and seizures conducted in accordance with 
the provisions of the Wildlife Code of Missouri1 are compliant with the Fourth 
Amendment. One commentator recently suggested: “[T]he Fourth Amendment 
should apply to game wardens to the same extent that it applies to police officers 
and other law enforcement officials. The arguments used by courts for departing 
from standard Fourth Amendment protections for game wardens and hunters do 
not pass muster.”2 Like Missouri state troopers, Missouri conservation agents 
are government officials who are designated as “officers of the state.”3 The duty 
and power to enforce laws related to fish and wildlife in Missouri is primarily 
delegated to conservation agents;4 however, an affirmative duty is also placed 
on all other law enforcement officers to “aid diligently” in the enforcement of 
these laws and regulations.5 No special Fourth Amendment waiver is possessed 
by conservation agents, and searches and seizures related to fish and wildlife, 
regardless of the uniform the officer is wearing, trigger the limitations of the 
Fourth Amendment.6 This Article does not advocate a weaker Fourth 
Amendment standard for searches and seizures conducted to enforce fish and 
wildlife related laws, but argues these laws and their associated enforcement 
procedures are within the scope of police activities permitted by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
 1. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.105 (2017) (“The rules of the Conservation Commission 
and statutory laws not inconsistent therewith shall constitute the Wildlife Code of Missouri . . . .”). 
 2. Ed R. Haden & Adam K. Israel, The Fourth Amendment, Game Wardens, and Hunters, 
46 CUMB. L. REV. 79, 80 (2015). 
 3. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 252.085.1 (2017) (“All authorized agents of the commission 
who have attained proper certification as peace officers in accordance with the provisions of chapter 
590 . . . are hereby declared to be officers of the state of Missouri and shall be so deemed and taken 
in all courts having jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of this state.”), with MO. REV. STAT. § 
43.190 (2017) (“The members of the patrol . . . are hereby declared to be officers of the state of 
Missouri and shall be so deemed and taken in all courts having jurisdiction of offenses against the 
laws of this state.”). 
 4. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.002 (2017). 
 5. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.070 (2017). 
 6. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989). 
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This Article begins with a discussion of the history of wildlife regulation in 
the United States and Missouri.7 The historical perspective is necessary to 
identify the “special needs” and “primary purpose” behind a government action 
and ultimately to evaluate the reasonableness of a government action in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment.8 The Article then discusses current 
regulatory structure and procedures in Missouri related to the enforcement of 
fish and wildlife related laws.9 Finally, it discusses and analyzes the 
constitutionality of the enforcement procedures, specifically search and seizure 
procedures associated with the enforcement of Missouri’s fish and wildlife 
related laws.10 
I.  A HISTORY OF FISH AND WILDLIFE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the same way that England is the source of our legal system, the origins 
of wildlife regulation in the United States has its origins in English law.11 In 
medieval England, the king was the ultimate owner of all land and also the head 
of government.12 The king was owner of all wild game in the realm and had the 
authority to grant hunting rights as he saw fit, regardless of land ownership.13 
As the power of the Parliament grew and the role of the king in the operation of 
government changed, so did the legal status of all wildlife.14 The English courts 
eventually determined that all valuable wild species were owned by the king in 
a sovereign capacity, instead of a proprietary one.15 The change in the nature of 
ownership required the king to “manage wildlife in the interests of the entire 
country, rather than for his own personal benefit.”16  
This precedent carried over to the laws enacted by the newly formed states 
following the American Revolution.17 The state legislatures and courts in 
America determined that the state, in its sovereign capacity, owned wild animals 
“in trust for the people generally and with a duty to manage them for the benefit 
of the many rather than the few.”18 The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the state 
ownership doctrine in Geer v. Connecticut19 in 1896.20 The Court upheld a 
 
 7. See infra Parts I, II. 
 8. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 44 (2000). 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 11. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 22–23 (2009). 
 12. Id. at 23. 
 13. Id. at 22–23. 
 14. Id. at 23. 
 15. Id. 
 16. FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 11, at 23. 
 17. Id. at 25. 
 18. Id. at 25–27. 
 19. 161 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1896). 
 20. FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 11, at 27. 
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Connecticut law that allowed game birds lawfully killed within the state to be 
sold within the state but prohibited the transport and sale of these birds outside 
the borders of the state.21 This discriminated overtly against interstate 
commerce, but the Court reasoned the state owned the game birds while they 
were in the wild and had “full power to decide who could take them and when,” 
including the precise property rights the hunter obtained upon capture.22 In 1979, 
the Supreme Court expressly overruled Geer in Hughes v. Oklahoma, when it 
struck down an Oklahoma law that prohibited the export of minnows taken from 
the wild.23 The Court found the law was contrary to the Commerce Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, and held the federal power to regulate interstate shipments 
of wildlife precluded states from banning interstate shipments of wildlife.24 
Though the Court appeared to expressly overrule Geer, the ruling in Hughes 
has not had a broad effect on the state ownership doctrine.25 The Court lacked 
the constitutional authority to overturn the state ownership doctrine, and the 
ruling has been interpreted to limit the specific federal issue of discrimination 
against interstate commerce related to wildlife.26 Since Hughes, several states 
have reaffirmed the state ownership doctrine and no state has elected to change 
their applicable statutes as a result of the decision.27 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE FISH AND WILDLIFE REGULATION IN MISSOURI 
In 1803, the land that would later become Missouri was purchased from 
France as a part of the Louisiana Purchase.28 At this time, this area was abundant 
with a wide variety of fish and wildlife species.29 Black bear, elk, buffalo, ruffed 
grouse, wild turkey, beaver, and prairie chicken all made their home in the land 
that would become Missouri.30 
As settlers moved westward through Missouri in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, most of the big game, except deer, were exterminated or 
driven from the state.31 The last concentration of elk was killed by market 
hunters in 1841, and by 1850, black bear were scarce, and the buffalo and 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 441 U.S. 322, 335, 338 (1979). 
 24. Id. at 338. 
 25. FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 11, at 29. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Peter J. Kastor, Making Missouri American: A Crowded Frontier in the Age of Lewis and 
Clark, OFFICIAL MANUAL: STATE OF MISSOURI, 2003–2004, at 13, 18–19, http://www.sos.mo.gov/ 
cmsimages/bluebook/2003-2004/0011-0035.pdf#12 [https://perma.cc/E6LN-W9VN]. 
 29. CHARLES CALLISON, MAN AND WILDLIFE IN MISSOURI: THE HISTORY OF ONE STATE’S 
TREATMENT OF ITS NATURAL RESOURCES 1–2 (1953). 
 30. Id. at 1. 
 31. Id. at 3. 
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antelope had migrated west.32 At the same time, turkeys were “too abundant to 
be worthy of mention,” deer were “found everywhere,” prairie chickens were 
“here by the thousands” and recorded as “abundant” throughout the state.33 As 
a result, market hunting was in full swing, and wagonloads of game were being 
dispatched from rural Missouri to be sold in urban areas on a regular basis.34 
Between 1870 and 1900, market hunting was in its prime, and Missouri saw the 
extinction of the passenger pigeon, the “decline of the deer, the turkey, the ruffed 
grouse, the prairie chicken, and . . . waterfowl” resulting from virtually 
unregulated commercialization of wildlife.35 
In 1851, urban sportsmen began to recognize the decline in wildlife 
populations, and the legislature passed Missouri’s first game law.36 The law only 
applied to St. Louis County and placed “closed seasons on deer, pheasants and 
quail, woodcocks, prairie chickens, grouse[,] and turkey.”37 
A little over twenty years later, the decline of wildlife populations became 
dramatic enough that the first two state-wide fish and game laws were passed.38 
An “Act for the Preservation of Game, Animals and Birds” and the “Act to 
Prevent the Destruction of Fish” were enacted into law.39 The Preservation of 
Game Act set open and closed seasons for animals such as deer, turkey, and 
prairie chickens; outlawed the most devastating harvest methods; and made it 
the duty of constables, market masters, and police to enforce these laws.40 
Thought of as laws of “fair trade practices” for market hunters, the laws were 
largely ignored and unenforced.41 
In 1895 the office of Game and Fish Warden was created, and in 1901 a law 
was passed which made it illegal to export wild game from the state, but no 
funding was provided for enforcement.42 The office of Game and Fish Warden 
was abolished in 1903, the year before the World’s Fair was held in St. Louis.43 
Bureau of Labor statistics indicated that nearly four million pounds of game 
were sold in Missouri in 1904, a record number.44 
In 1905, in response to public outcry from the sale of game at the World’s 
Fair, and dwindling wildlife populations, the legislature passed the “Walmsley 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. CALLISON, supra note 29, at 2. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. at 3–4. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id. 
 39. CALLISON, supra note 29, at 4. 
 40. Id. at 4 (explaining that the Act to Prevent the Destruction of Fish prohibited “the use of 
drugs, fish berries,” and explosives). 
 41. Id. at 4–7. 
 42. Id. at 6. 
 43. Id. 
 44. CALLISON, supra note 29, at 6. 
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Law.”45 The law authorized the sale of hunting and fishing licenses and provided 
funding for a staff of wardens.46 For the first time in Missouri, the law gave 
statutory recognition to the common law principle that wildlife belongs to the 
state.47 It also established open and closed seasons for most game species, and 
it prohibited the sale and commercial transportation of game.48 The law became 
the basis of Missouri’s fish and game laws until 1936.49 
Despite the Walmsley Law, wildlife populations continued to decline.50 By 
1934, market hunting had exploited wildlife populations to the degree it was 
estimated that less than 100 grouse, approximately 2,000 deer, 3,500 wild 
turkey, and 100 beaver remained in the state.51 The citizens of Missouri sought 
change to restore fish and wildlife populations in Missouri.52 In 1935, a 
constitutional amendment aimed at wildlife conservation was drafted by 
sportsmen and placed on the ballot through the Missouri constitution’s 
referendum and petition process.53 The citizens of Missouri voted on the 
amendment in 1936, and adopted it by the largest majority ever received by an 
amendment to the constitution of Missouri.54 This amendment created the 
Missouri Conservation Commission and provides the foundation for the current 
mechanism for regulating the fish, forest, and wildlife resources of Missouri.55 
III.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEDURES IN MISSOURI 
Article IV, section 40(a) of the Missouri constitution establishes the 
exclusive regulatory authority of the Conservation Commission (“the 
Commission”) and states: 
The control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation of the bird, 
fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state, including hatcheries, 
sanctuaries, refuges, reservations and all other property owned, acquired or used 
for such purposes and the acquisition and establishment thereof, and the 
administration of all laws pertaining thereto, shall be vested in a conservation 
commission consisting of four members appointed by the governor, by and with 
 
 45. Id. at 8. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. CALLISON, supra note 29, at 9–11. 
 50. Id. at 13. 
 51. JAMES F. KEEFE, THE FIRST 50 YEARS 4 (1987). 
 52. See CALLISON, supra note 29, at 19–34 (discussing the formation of the Conservation 
Federation of Missouri and the origins of Proposition 4). 
 53. KEEFE, supra note 51, at 15–16. 
 54. Id. at 15. Proposition 4, the constitutional amendment creating the Missouri Conservation 
Commission, passed by a vote of 879,000 to 351,000. Id. 
 55. See MO. CONST. art. IV, §§ 40–46. 
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the advice and consent of the senate, not more than two of whom shall be of the 
same political party.56 
Other provisions in article IV establish the Commission’s rule making 
authority, repeal any laws which are inconsistent with regulations of the 
Commission, and grant the legislature the authority to enact laws in support of 
the regulations of the Commission.57 
In Marsh v. Bartlett, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the authority of the 
Commission to regulate fish and wildlife when an angler was convicted of 
violating a fishing statute which conflicted with the regulations of the 
Commission.58 The court found the validity of the constitutional provisions 
granting authority to the Commission to be “absolute” in relation to the power 
to regulate and control game and fish within the state.59 While the Commission 
has the exclusive authority to regulate fish and game, the court made it clear that 
only the legislature could fix punishments for violating regulations enacted by 
the Commission.60 
A. The Regulatory Framework in Missouri 
In support of the rules established by the Conservation Commission, the 
Missouri legislature has enacted numerous statutes related to the regulation of 
fish and wildlife.61 The statutes establish the title and ownership of all wildlife 
in Missouri;62 declare conservation agents to be officers of the state and grant 
them arrest powers for violations of wildlife laws and regulations;63 fix criminal 
penalties for violations of wildlife laws and regulations;64 and establish the 
search and license inspection authority of conservation agents.65 
In turn, the Conservation Commission has enacted regulations granting 
authority to conservation agents, and all peace officers, to enforce the Wildlife 
Code; established conditions for acquiring permits and privileges; regulated the 
take, sale or commercial use, possession, transportation, and storage of wildlife; 
implemented inspection and documentation requirements; and enacted various 
regulations related to the use of lands owned, managed, or leased by the 
Commission.66 
 
 56. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 40(a). 
 57. MO. CONST. art. IV, §§ 44–45. 
 58. 121 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo. 1938). 
 59. Id. at 744. 
 60. Id. at 744–45. 
 61. See MO. REV. STAT. § 252 (2017). 
 62. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.030 (2017). 
 63. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.080 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 252.085 (2017). 
 64. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.040 (2017). 
 65. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.060 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100 (2017). 
 66. See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10, ch. 4–20 (2017). 
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The statutes related to fish and wildlife, and the regulations enacted by the 
Conservation Commission pursuant to its constitutional authority, provide the 
framework for regulating hunting, fishing, and other uses of wildlife in 
Missouri.67 
B. Law Enforcement Procedures Used by Conservation Agents to Enforce 
Regulations 
Conservation agents conduct routine stops and searches, without suspicion 
of any criminal wrongdoing, of persons engaged in fish and wildlife related 
activities: hunting, fishing, trapping, and the commercial uses of fish and 
wildlife. This has been the consistent method of enforcement throughout the 
history of Missouri.68 During fiscal year 2015, conservation agents contacted 
178,828 hunters and anglers to ensure compliance with the Wildlife Code.69 
During these contacts, conservation agents uncovered 25,245 violations, which 
resulted in 7,066 arrests.70 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES RELATED 
TO ENFORCING REGULATIONS GOVERNING HUNTING, FISHING, AND OTHER 
USES OF FISH AND WILDLIFE 
There has been very little guidance from the state and federal judiciaries on 
the constitutional implications of the fish and wildlife related inspections 
conducted by conservation agents in Missouri. Aside from a brief mention in the 
concurring opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court has remained 
silent on the matter.71 The Eighth Circuit has not delivered an opinion, and other 
than the 1926 Missouri Supreme Court decision in State v. Bennett,72 Missouri 
courts have been silent. In Bennett, the court upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute requiring a hunter to permit the game commissioner or his deputies to 
inspect and count the fish, birds, animals, and game in his possession to 
determine their legality.73 However, this decision was prior to the creation of the 
Missouri Conservation Commission and the current framework for regulating 
fish and wildlife resources in Missouri.74 It was also prior to the Supreme 
 
 67. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.105 (“The rules of the Conservation Commission and 
statutory laws not inconsistent therewith shall constitute the Wildlife Code of Missouri . . . .”). 
 68. See generally Gene W. Arras, The Theory of Enforcement of Wildlife Conservation, 13 ST. 
LOUIS B.J., Summer 1967, at 37; George J. Pruneau, Anatomy of a Missouri Conservation Agent, 
23 J. MO. B., Jan. 1967, at 301. 
 69. Missouri Department of Conservation, Annual Report, ANN. REV., July 2014–June 2015, 
at 4. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 72. 288 S.W. 50, 51 (Mo. 1926). 
 73. Id. at 53. 
 74. See supra Parts II, III. 
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Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the Fourth Amendment’s 
privacy protections to state actions through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.75 
Since Mapp, the Fourth Amendment has been at the heart of any analysis 
surrounding the constitutionality of a search or seizure of a citizen by a 
government agent, including inspections of hunters, anglers, trappers, and other 
users of fish and wildlife resources.76 The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.77 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials”78 
and to “protect[] people, not places” from unreasonable government intrusion.79 
As the Supreme Court indicated in Oregon v. Hass, a state may impose 
greater restrictions on police activity than is required by the U.S. Constitution.80 
For example, in a case involving a game warden’s search of private property for 
an illegal bull elk, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted the language of its 
state constitution to afford its citizens broader protection than the Fourth 
Amendment in cases involving “searches of, or seizures from, private 
property.”81 Missouri courts, however, have interpreted the provisions of the 
Missouri constitution against unreasonable search and seizure to offer no greater 
 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 76. See Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014); People v. Maikhio, 253 
P.3d 247, 257 (Cal. 2011); State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 314 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1988). 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 78. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
 79. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 80. 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater 
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional 
standards.”) 
 81. State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75–76 (Mont. 1995) (“We conclude that in Montana a 
person may have an expectation of privacy in an area of land that is beyond the curtilage which the 
society of this State is willing to recognize as reasonable, and that where that expectation is 
evidenced by fencing, ‘No Trespassing,’ or similar signs, or ‘by some other means [which] 
indicate[s] unmistakably that entry is not permitted,’ entry by law enforcement officers requires 
permission or a warrant.” (citations omitted)). 
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protection than the U.S. Constitution.82 Consequently, a search or seizure that 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, also will not violate article 1, section 
15 of the Missouri constitution.83 
V.  THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO “SEARCHES” AND 
“SEIZURES” CONDUCTED DURING FISH AND WILDLIFE RELATED INSPECTIONS 
IN MISSOURI 
Conservation agents are law enforcement officers who routinely contact 
individuals engaged in fish and wildlife related activities to determine if they are 
in compliance with applicable regulations.84 As with any other interaction 
between a citizen and a law enforcement officer, the specific facts of each 
interaction will determine whether a search or seizure has occurred.85 Missouri 
statutes and regulations place an affirmative duty on anglers, hunters, and others 
utilizing fish and wildlife resources to submit to an inspection to determine 
compliance with applicable laws.86 Considering this, and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Katz, Jones, and Mendenhall,87 it follows that a “search” and/or 
“seizure” subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment may occur at 
some point during the inspection process. 
While Missouri courts have not weighed in on this issue, the courts in other 
states have been reluctant to find a search or seizure has occurred when a wildlife 
officer simply approaches a potential hunter or angler and asks them questions 
while they are afield.88 However, the detention of a person by a wildlife officer 
for the purpose of conducting a fish and wildlife related inspection may amount 
to a Fourth Amendment seizure of his person.89 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 82. State v. Hastings, 450 S.W.3d 479, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 83. Id. (“The analysis under both the U.S. Constitution and the Missouri Constitution is 
identical.”); see MO. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes, effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, or access electronic data or 
communication, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to 
be seized, or the data or communication to be accessed, as nearly as may be; nor without probable 
cause, supported by written oath or affirmation.”). 
 84. See supra Part III. 
 85. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 551 (1980). 
 86. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.125 (2017). 
 87. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551; Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 88. State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 316 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999); State v. Colosimo, 669 
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2003). 
 89. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (“When the officers detained appellant for the 
purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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discussed this distinction in People v. Colosimo.90 In Colosimo, the wildlife 
officer approached Colosimo and conversed with him while he was sitting in his 
already stopped boat that rested on the trailer of a parked truck.91 During the 
conversation, the officer asked Colosimo if he had caught any fish and if there 
were any fish in the boat.92 Colosimo admitted to the officer he had been fishing, 
and the boat contained fish.93 The officer subsequently asked to see the fish, 
Colosimo refused, and an argument between them began over the officer’s legal 
authority to board the boat and inspect the catch.94 The officer ultimately did not 
board the boat and inspect the fish, but he did issue Colosimo a ticket for failing 
to present wildlife for inspection.95 The court held the initial interaction between 
the officer and Colosimo, where the officer walked up and conversed with him 
while his boat rested on the trailer of a parked portage truck, did not amount to 
a seizure for the Fourth Amendment.96 However, the court also stated: “There 
may be little doubt that after Colosimo admitted to having been fishing and the 
fact that he was transporting fish, he was seized by Officer Steen.”97 
The question of when a seizure occurs is less ambiguous when a wildlife 
officer conducts a vehicle stop. The supreme courts of California and Iowa, and 
the Ninth Circuit, have held a vehicle stop by a wildlife officer to conduct a fish 
or wildlife related inspection is a seizure within the context of the Fourth 
Amendment.98 Courts have also found a seizure occurs when motorists are 
stopped during roadblock checkpoints for the purpose of conducting inspections 
of anglers, hunters, and others who may be transporting wildlife.99 
Whether a search occurs during a fish or wildlife related contact will depend 
on the facts of the situation, the degree of intrusion on the privacy interests 
involved, and the conduct of the officer.100 In State v. Boyer, the Montana 
Supreme Court held that both the officer’s request to inspect an angler’s license 
and concealed catch and the officer stepping on the bow of a boat to look in a 
live well of a boat did not constitute a “search” for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.101 Conversely, in State v. Larsen, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 90. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 4. 
 91. Id. at 3. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014); People v. Maikhio, 253 
P.3d 247, 257 (Cal. 2011); State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1988). 
 99. State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 427–28 (Or. 1980); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 
724 (S.D. 1979). 
 100. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952–54 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 353, 356–57 (1967). 
 101. 42 P.3d 771, 775–77 (Mont. 2002). 
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found an unlawful search occurred when a conservation officer entered an ice 
fishing house without a warrant, permission, probable cause, or other 
justification for the purpose of inspecting the number of fishing lines being used 
by the angler inside.102 
VI.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FISH AND WILDLIFE RELATED INSPECTIONS 
IN MISSOURI 
In Delaware v. Prouse, the U.S. Supreme Court provides its only mention 
of the permissibility of inspections conducted by game wardens, wildlife 
officers, and conservation agents.103 In Prouse, the officer stopped a motorist on 
a public roadway to check and see if he was properly licensed to operate a motor 
vehicle.104 The Court concluded that motorists could not be randomly stopped 
for the officer to inspect a driver’s license, and at a minimum, reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity was required for the stop to be constitutional.105 
At first glance, this seems to cast doubt on the constitutionality of inspections 
conducted by conservation agents and other wildlife officers around the 
country.106 However, in the concurring opinion, Justices Blackmun and Powell 
stated the following about their understanding of the effect of the majority’s 
holding on random license inspections conducted by wildlife officers: 
And I would not regard the present case as a precedent that throws any 
constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and 
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the performance of 
their duties. In a situation of that type, it seems to me, the Court’s balancing 
process, and the value factors under consideration, would be quite different.107 
Courts around the country often cite, and follow, the logic of this concurring 
opinion when confronted with evaluating the constitutionality of inspection 
procedures utilized by wildlife officers.108 These decisions have primarily found 
inspections permissible as a matter of general reasonableness,109 consent to an 
inspection as a condition of exercising a privilege,110 or as an administrative 
 
 102. 650 N.W.2d 144, 146, 153–54 (Minn. 2002). 
 103. 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979). 
 104. Id. at 650–51. 
 105. Id. at 663. 
 106. See supra Part III. 
 107. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 664. 
 108. People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 261–62 (Cal. 2011); Elzey v. State, 519 S.E.2d 751, 
753–55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 314 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 8, 14–15 (Minn. 2003); State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 43–44 (Iowa 
1988). 
 109. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d at 47. 
 110. Elzey, 519 S.E.2d at 755; People v. Layton, 522 N.E.2d 1280, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); 
State v. Bennett, 288 S.W. 50, 51–52 (Mo. 1926); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724–25 
(S.D. 1979). 
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inspection associated with a “pervasively regulated” enterprise.111 The 
remainder of this part will analyze these constitutional theories, and issues 
presented by their application to inspections conducted by Missouri 
conservation agents of hunters, anglers, and others utilizing fish and wildlife 
resources. 
A. Inspections Related to Hunting, Fishing, and Other Uses of Wildlife in 
Missouri Are Not Prohibited by the Constitution Because They Are 
Reasonable 
Conservation agents routinely conduct seizures of hunters and anglers 
without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing to inspect licenses, game, 
and equipment in their possession.112 Under the test for reasonableness 
established by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, when a seizure is not made 
pursuant to a warrant, probable cause, or a recognized exception, in order to 
determine if a search is reasonable, courts must balance the legitimate 
governmental interest and degree to which the seizure promotes the interest 
against the severity of the intrusion on the subject of the seizure.113 Inspections 
conducted by conservation agents are reasonable when analyzed under the three-
factor balancing test of Brown.114  
1. There Is a Legitimate Governmental Interest in the Enforcement of 
Wildlife Related Laws in Missouri 
Courts around the country have recognized that states have a substantial 
interest in the enforcement of laws regulating the use of its wildlife.115 The Idaho 
Supreme Court found a compelling interest in the management of its wildlife 
and acknowledged, “fish and game violations are matters of grave public 
concern which justify minimal intrusion into the public’s right to privacy.”116 
A similar substantial interest exists in Missouri. The Missouri Department 
of Conservation has conducted statistically accountable attitude, opinion, 
 
 111. See Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2014); Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 
265; State v. Klager, 797 N.W.2d 47, 52–53 (S.D. 2011). 
 112. See supra Part III. 
 113. 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979). 
 114. Id. 
 115. State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1988); State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 430 
(Or. 1980) (“[T]he governmental interest in the enforcement of laws for the preservation of wildlife 
in this state is sufficiently substantial to justify the minimal intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment 
rights of those stopped for brief questioning and a visual inspection of their vehicles.”); Halverson, 
277 N.W.2d at 725 (“[T]he uninterrupted use of the highways is slight and greatly outweighed by 
the public interest in the management and conservation of wildlife in this state.”). 
 116. State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 314 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (quoting State v. Medley, 898 
P.2d 1093, 1096 (Idaho 1995)). 
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satisfaction, and participation surveys for more than thirty years.117 In the most 
recent survey, ninety-five percent of Missourians reported they are interested in 
Missouri’s fish, forests, and wildlife; eighty-nine percent reported it was 
important for outdoor places to be protected even if they did not intend to visit 
them; and sixty-five percent of Missourians believed the Department of 
Conservation was doing a good job of enforcing fish and wildlife laws.118 It is 
also estimated that the total economic impact of fish and wildlife recreation and 
the forest products industry in Missouri is more than twelve billion dollars 
annually, annual expenditures related to fish and wildlife regulation support 
56,910 jobs, expenditures related to these activities generate more than $507 
million annually in tax revenue, and 2.5 million people age sixteen years and 
older participate in fishing, hunting, and wildlife related recreation each year.119 
These facts, coupled with the constitutional authority granted to the 
Conservation Commission by the citizens of Missouri,120 establish a substantial 
governmental interest in closely regulating the fish and wildlife resources of the 
state. 
2. Inspections Are a Reasonable Method to Advance the Governmental 
Interest Involved in Enforcing Wildlife Related Laws in Missouri 
Advancement of the governmental interest in wildlife officers contacting 
hunters and anglers despite no suspicion of wrongdoing has primarily been 
examined in the context of fish and wildlife related checkpoints.121 In these 
cases, the courts have found the governmental interest was advanced because 
wildlife officers are responsible for enforcing wildlife laws in expansive rural 
areas with few officers,122 stops are necessary to attain a satisfactory level of 
enforcement of game laws,123 enforcement of game laws is difficult,124 
“checkpoints are often the least restrictive means” of enforcement,125 and there 
really isn’t any other “effective means” of enforcing fish and wildlife related 
 
 117. Missouri Department of Conservation, supra note 69, at 16. 
 118. Id. at 17. 
 119. Id. at 18. 
 120. See supra Part II. 
 121. Thurman, 996 P.2d at 314–15; State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d 1181, 1184 (Me. 1990); State 
v. Albaugh, 571 N.W.2d 345, 347–48 (N.D. 1997); State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 433–34 (Or. 
1980); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724–25 (S.D. 1979). 
 122. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at 1185 (reasoning that because fish and game officers are 
responsible for enforcing “laws with limited numbers of personnel over a wide territory,” much of 
which is uninhabited, fish and game checkpoints are a justified method of enforcement); Thurman, 
996 P.2d at 315 (explaining that only two wildlife officers were available to police a rural and 
expansive area the size of New Jersey for fish and game violations). 
 123. State v. McHugh, 630 So. 2d 1259, 1267 (La. 1994). 
 124. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d at 430. 
 125. Albaugh, 571 N.W.2d at 348. 
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laws.126 In State v. Keehner, the Supreme Court of Iowa extended this analysis 
to the context of a vehicle stop conducted by an officer to conduct an inspection 
of an occupant who the officer reasonably believed was hunting.127 The court 
specifically noted that several courts have stricken stops as unconstitutional due 
to the perceived existence of less intrusive alternatives but stated:  
However, in the context of the enforcement of our state’s hunting regulations, 
and specifically the requirement of license demonstration involved here, we can 
conceive of no such options. The standard we apply today also contains its own 
limitation so as not to commit the seizure to the unfettered discretion of the 
officer: In order to be stopped, the individual must first be engaged in an activity 
which may be reasonably interpreted as “hunting.”128 
A similar rationale is applicable in Missouri related to the advancement of 
the governmental interest involved in enforcing the Wildlife Code of Missouri. 
Missouri is the nineteenth largest state in the country at 69,697 square miles,129 
and, as of July 2016, has an estimated population of 6,093,000 people.130 Out of 
this population, 576,000 people hunt, 1,000,000 people fish, and hunters 
reported harvesting 255,035 deer and 56,718 turkeys.131 Of the 14,554 law 
enforcement officers in the state of Missouri, only 204 are conservation agents 
charged with the primary duty of enforcing fish and wildlife related 
regulations.132 These facts demonstrate that Missouri is a large area with 
relatively few conservation available to enforce fish and wildlife related laws. 
Enforcement of fish and wildlife laws is difficult and there really is not any 
other effective means of advancing Missouri’s policy of protecting the fish and 
wildlife resources of the state without conducting inspections of those engaged 
in hunting, fishing, or other uses of wildlife. In Prouse, the Court concluded 
alternative law enforcement methods to advance the state’s interest in ensuring 
highway safety were available, and random stops of motorists to inspect licenses 
were unreasonable.133 The Court acknowledged that acting upon observed 
violations of traffic and vehicle safety laws provided ample opportunity to 
inspect licenses, insurance, safety requirements, etc.; violations of minimum-
safety requirements for motor vehicles are readily observable; and vehicles must 
 
 126. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d at 724. 
 127. 425 N.W.2d 41, 43, 45 (Iowa 1988). 
 128. Id. at 45. 
 129. Missouri: Location, Size, and Extent, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/states/ 
Missouri-Location-size-and-extent.html [https://perma.cc/6LQG-QMQZ]. 
 130. QuickFacts: Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045216/29 [https://perma.cc/44W6-MFS5]. 
 131. Missouri Department of Conservation, supra note 69, at 19, 89–90. 
 132. BRIAN REAVES, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES 15 (2011). 
 133. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979). 
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carry and display current license plates.134 Unlike in the motor vehicle context, 
violations of fish and wildlife regulations are not easily observable without first 
contacting the hunter or angler. Hunters and anglers conduct their activities in 
remote locations and wear clothing to conceal themselves. Fish and wildlife 
harvested is typically stored in a coat, bag, creel, or other container, making it 
impossible to observe and count animals in possession. The type of firearm, 
ammunition, game calls, fishing lures, and other methods used to take wildlife 
are usually concealed or not easily recognizable without close observation. 
Different permits are required based upon the species pursued, the open seasons 
for many species overlap, and the techniques employed to be a successful hunter 
or angler make it impractical to require those engaged in the activity to openly 
display their license in most circumstances. These factors make it impossible to 
determine if the rules have been followed until a hunter or angler has been 
stopped for an inspection. 
The Keehner court established that the touchstone for Fourth Amendment 
compliance is not whether the stop is random or suspicionless, but whether the 
government action was reasonable.135 Considering the size of the state and the 
number of hunters and anglers compared to the low number of conservation 
agents, the difficulty of enforcing these regulations, and the lack of practical 
alternatives for effective enforcement, random inspections of hunters, anglers, 
and others utilizing wildlife is a reasonable method of advancing Missouri’s 
governmental interest of protecting the fish and wildlife resources of the state. 
3. The Severity of the Intrusion Involved in Enforcing Wildlife Related 
Laws is Minimal in Missouri 
The severity of the intrusion must be evaluated by both objective and 
subjective criteria to determine reasonableness.136 The objective part of the 
balancing test is “measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the 
investigation.”137 The subjective part of the balancing test gauges the potential 
for causing fear and surprise on lawful travelers.138 
When looked at objectively, the severity of the intrusion of inspections 
conducted by conservation agents is minimal. Inspections typically take place 
while in open fields outside of the home or other areas which enjoy a heightened 
expectation of privacy. This is where hunters and anglers pursue their endeavors. 
Furthermore, the regulations and statutes governing inspections mandate 
inspections to be of short duration and relatively innocuous. They specifically 
 
 134. Id. at 659–60. 
 135. State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1988). 
 136. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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limit the scope of the inspection to inquiries related to licenses, hunting or 
fishing equipment, and wildlife in the individual’s possession.139 
As for the subjective component, conservation agents make contacts with 
citizens while wearing a distinctive uniform and patrol in vehicles marked with 
the insignia of the Missouri Department of Conservation. As the Keehner court 
acknowledged, Iowa law requires those who engage in the act of hunting to 
display a license upon request.140 Because citizens are presumed to know the 
law, the court presumed those engaged in an activity such as hunting, know they 
may be stopped briefly and required to display a license.141 Missouri also has 
similar laws in place regarding the display of a license when engaging in an 
activity such as hunting or fishing.142 Considering these factors, the potential for 
fear or surprise is minimal because the contacts are made by uniformed 
conservation agents, and lawful travelers would expect those who are engaged 
in activities such as hunting or fishing to be briefly stopped for an inspection. 
B. Inspections Related to Hunting, Fishing, and Other Uses of Wildlife in 
Missouri Are Constitutional Because Hunters and Anglers Consent to 
Inspection as a Condition of Exercising the Privilege 
Consent to an inspection can be inferred in the context of exercising the 
privilege of hunting, fishing, and other uses of wildlife. It is well established that 
a search is reasonable when a person consents to the search.143 It is also settled 
that sometimes consent to a search does not have to be express but can be 
inferred from the context.144 
Agreeing to certain conditions to exercise a privilege regulated by the state 
is not unique to the hunting and fishing context in Missouri.145 This was 
illustrated by the Missouri Court of Appeals in the context of operating a motor 
vehicle on public roads in Bertram v. Director of Revenue:  
The theory of the “implied consent law” is that “the use of public streets and 
highways is a privilege and not a right,” and that by obtaining a license and 
 
 139. See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.125 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100.1 (2017); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 252.060 (2017). 
 140. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d at 44. 
 141. Id. 
 142. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.060 (2017). 
 143. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
 144. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013). 
 145. See Bertram v. Dir. of Revenue, 930 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). But see Birchfield 
v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2165, 2186 (2016). In the context of “implied consent” there 
must be a limit to the consequences a motorist consents to by virtue of operating a motor vehicle 
on public highways. The court held that “motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit 
to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.” Id. 
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exercising the privilege of using the public roads, the motorist has impliedly 
consented to submission to the chemical test.146 
Like the use of public streets and highways, the use of the fish and wildlife 
resources located in Missouri is also a privilege. The U.S. Constitution contains 
no express provisions establishing the right of citizens to use fish and wildlife 
resources.147 While the constitutions of some states do contain provisions 
guaranteeing the right to hunt and fish, the Missouri Constitution contains no 
such provision.148 To the contrary, the Missouri Constitution contains a 
sovereign ownership provision granting the exclusive authority to administer all 
laws pertaining to “[t]he control, management, restoration, conservation and 
regulation of the bird, fish, game forestry and all wildlife resources of the state” 
in the Conservation Commission.149 This supports the conclusion that hunting, 
fishing, and other uses of wildlife in Missouri is a privilege instead of a right. 
Consent to inspection as a condition of exercising the privilege of hunting, 
fishing, and other uses of wildlife in Missouri was theorized prior to the 
formation of the modern Conservation Commission, and was first recognized in 
State v. Bennett:  
[T]he defendant cannot play fast and loose, that by accepting a hunter’s license 
and exercising the privilege under the restrictions and limitations of the statute, 
one of which was his duty to submit to the inspection and count of the quail in 
his possession by the game warden, he waived the constitutional rights invoked 
so far as applicable to the facts in this case.150 
The laws providing the basis for Bennett have been replaced;151 however, the 
modern regulatory framework still provides support for this concept. 
The idea of state ownership provides the basis for this enforcement 
theory.152 Those who pursue, take, possess, or otherwise utilize the fish and 
wildlife resources “consent that title of said wildlife shall be and remain in the 
state of Missouri,”153 for the purposes of conserving, managing, and regulating 
wildlife.154 The regulations provide that acceptance of a permit is conditioned 
on compliance with the provisions of the Wildlife Code, which include 
inspections.155 Additionally, each permit issued must be signed by the person it 
 
 146. 930 S.W.2d. at 9. 
 147. See generally U.S. CONST. 
 148. Ryan Notarangelo, Hunting Down the Meaning of the Second Amendment: An American 
Right to Pursue Game, 61 S.D. L. REV. 201, 203–04 & n.14 (2016). 
 149. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 40(a). 
 150. State v. Bennett, 288 S.W. 50, 53 (Mo. 1926). 
 151. See supra Part III. 
 152. Arras, supra note 68, at 48. 
 153. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.030 (2017). 
 154. Arras, supra note 68, at 48. 
 155. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-5.215(3) (2017) (“The acceptance of a permit or privilege or 
method exemption shall constitute an acknowledgement of the duty to comply with the provisions 
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to whom it is issued,156 and has the following acknowledgement statement 
printed on its face: “I agree to comply with the Wildlife Code, to present this 
permit upon request to any officer authorized to enforce wildlife rules, and allow 
such officer to inspect wildlife in possession to determine compliance with 
rules.”157 
Much like how consent to submit to a chemical test under Missouri’s 
implied consent law is limited to circumstances specified in the statute,158 
consent to an inspection by an officer charged with the enforcement of the 
Wildlife Code is also limited by statute.159 One statute provides that officers 
“may search without warrant any creel, container, game bag, hunting coat or 
boat in which he has reason to believe wildlife is unlawfully possessed or 
concealed” but requires a warrant to enter and search “an occupied dwelling or 
out-building immediately adjacent thereto, cold storage locker plant, motor 
vehicle or sealed freight car.”160 Another makes it “the duty of every person 
holding a license or permit . . . to submit the same for inspection by any agent 
of the commission.”161 The qualifications and limitations identified in these 
statutes establish the scope of the inspection which is implicitly consented to by 
purchasing a permit or taking game.162 
The acknowledgement statement printed on every permit allows an officer 
to inspect wildlife in the “possession” of a permit-holder.163 If applied broadly, 
the term “possession” is problematic because it extends the consent implied from 
the purchase of a license or taking of game beyond the scope authorized by 
statute or intended by the Commission.164 The Commission likely intended a 
narrower interpretation of the scope of the consent feature because within title 
3, section 10-4.125 of the Missouri Code of Regulations, the rule specifies 
inspection is “subject to the provision of section 252.100, RSMo.”165 
Consequently, the term “possession” in the acknowledgment statement printed 
 
of this Code and to pursue wildlife in a safe manner, and all permits and privileges are conditioned 
upon such compliance.”); MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.125 (2017) (Inspection). 
 156. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-5.210 (2017). 
 157. For an example of a Missouri Hunting Permit, and the acknowledgment statement on the 
permit, see CWD Testing Results, MO. DEP’T CONSERVATION, http://mdc7.mdc.mo.gov/applica 
tions/cwdSurveillance/cwdSurveillance.aspx [https://perma.cc/6LQG-QMQZ]. 
 158. See MO. REV. STAT. § 577.020.1 (2017). Some circumstances where consent to a chemical 
test is triggered are if the person is arrested for operating a motor vehicle or vessel while intoxicated, 
involvement in a collision or accident causing a fatality or serious physical injury, or an arrest for 
specified traffic or boating violations. Id. 
 159. See MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100.1 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 252.060 (2017). 
 160. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100.1 (2017). 
 161. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.060 (2017). 
 162. Arras, supra note 68, at 48, 51. 
 163. Id. at 51. 
 164. Id. 
 165. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.125 (2017). 
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on the license should be read to limit the consent feature to the circumstances 
prescribed in the statute, and not to all wildlife in the person’s “possession.”166 
The concept of consent is fundamental to the authority granted to officers to 
inspect but extends no further than the qualifications and limitations of the 
statute.167 
The concept of consent to an inspection as a condition of exercising the 
privilege of fishing, hunting, or other uses of wildlife is not exclusive to Missouri 
and has also found support from the courts in other states.168 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has also had the opportunity to review this issue in the context of fish and 
wildlife related inspections but declined to do so.169 
In People v. Layton, a conservation officer observed several individuals 
returning to their vehicle after their hunt and approached them to check their 
hunting licenses and inspect their vehicles for illegal game.170 During the search 
of Layton’s vehicle, the conservation officer discovered several bags of 
cannabis.171 The Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the search and stated in its 
decision: 
Hunting is a privilege, not a right, to which licensing requirements apply. 
Because of the nature of hunting, we conclude that licensing (or hunting without 
a license) may be deemed consent to some intrusions. . . . 
  . . . .  
  . . . defendant fit what might be termed a “hunter’s profile,” [therefore] we 
deem implied consent sufficient to sustain the search—which we emphasize 
was, according to the officer’s testimony, limited to containers of a size and type 
as experience dictated might be used for holding separate any illegally taken 
game . . . .172 
Haden and Israel contend that consent to inspection as a condition of 
exercising the privilege of hunting or fishing does not pass the “unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine” of Frost v. Railroad Commission.173 In Frost, the Supreme 
Court held that a state “may not impose conditions which require the 
relinquishment of constitutional rights.”174 To illustrate impermissible state 
conduct, Haden and Israel analogize the implicit consent of hunters to seizures 
 
 166. Arras, supra note 68, at 51. 
 167. Id. at 48. 
 168. Elzey v. State, 519 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); See People v. Layton, 552 N.E.2d 
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for license checks as a condition of the privilege of hunting, to a state 
conditioning drivers’ licenses on consent to stops and searches of 
automobiles.175 This comparison is inaccurate because it fails to recognize the 
qualifications and limitations of the consent in the context of fish and wildlife 
inspections.176 The consent agreed to in Missouri is not to a general search like 
in the example offered by Haden and Israel, but the scope is limited by the 
applicable statutes and regulations to only what is necessary to advance the 
state’s interest in enforcing laws to protect its fish and wildlife.177 This is more 
akin to implied consent laws related to enforcement of DWI laws. The Supreme 
Court in Missouri v. McNeely noted that, “all 50 States have adopted implied 
consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle 
within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise 
detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”178 
Regardless, the unconstitutional-conditions argument advanced by Haden 
and Israel fails because it is questionable whether the implied consent statute 
related to fish and wildlife179 is substantially coercive or authorizes a search that 
violates the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, in either case, constitutional 
rights are not relinquished. In the context of driving, those who are subject to 
the implied consent law are still free to refuse to submit to the test.180 And in the 
fish and wildlife context, hunters or anglers are also free to withdraw consent 
and refuse to submit their game for inspection. However, in both cases, there are 
consequences for doing so.181  
C. Inspections Related to Hunting, Fishing, and Other Uses of Wildlife in 
Missouri Are Constitutional Because They are Highly Regulated Activities 
Which Are Subject to an Administrative Inspection 
Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized an exception for 
warrantless administrative searches of certain types of industries which have a 
 
 175. Haden & Israel, supra note 2, at 90. 
 176. See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.125 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100.1 (2017); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 252.060 (2017). 
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pervasive history of regulation.182 The Court recognized the need to conduct 
surprise inspections of these “closely regulated industries” to advance the 
regulatory scheme.183 In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court extended the warrantless 
administrative search exception to the coal mining industry, an industry which 
did not have a long history of pervasive regulation.184 The Court reasoned that 
so long as the business was subject to comprehensive regulations, administrative 
agencies could perform warrantless inspections without any suspicion of a 
violation.185 In New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court established the current 
constitutional standards for determining the validity of warrantless 
administrative searches.186 Under Burger, warrantless administrative searches 
are valid if: (1) there is a substantial government interest in regulating the 
industry or activity; (2) the warrantless inspections are necessary to further the 
regulatory scheme; (3) there is a constitutionally adequate substitute for a 
warrant; and (4) the time, place, and scope of the inspection must appropriately 
limit the discretion of inspecting officers.187 
Courts around the country have found hunting, fishing, and other uses of 
wildlife are highly regulated activities, and have upheld warrantless 
administrative inspections conducted by wildlife officers using the Burger 
rationale.188 In People v. Maikhio, the California Supreme Court reasoned: 
[T]he state interest underlying a stop and demand pursuant to section 2012 is 
quite distinct from the state’s ordinary interest in the enforcement of its criminal 
law, and the limited category of persons affected by the procedure—anglers and 
hunters—are individuals who have chosen to engage in a heavily regulated 
activity that reduces their reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the 
type of intrusion at issue.189 
 
 182. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712–13 (1987) (automobile junk yards); Donovan v. 
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 596 (1981) (mining); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1972) 
(firearms dealing); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 392 U.S. 72, 76–77 (1970) (liquor 
sales). 
 183. See, e.g., Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 74–75, 77 (permitting surprise inspections of retail 
alcohol businesses). 
 184. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 596. 
 185. Id. at 600, 605–06. 
 186. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See, e.g., People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 256, 262–63 (Cal. 2011) (upholding 
warrantless administrative stop and search of defendant’s vehicle after warden observed defendant 
fishing lobster); State v. Klager, 797 N.W.2d 47, 49–50 (S.D. 2011) (upholding the warrantless 
inspection of the records of the defendant’s taxidermy business); State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 
1, 2, 9 (Minn. 2003) (holding that game warden was entitled to search defendant’s boat despite no 
suspicion of fishing violation); State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 773, 779 (Mont. 2002) (upholding 
warrantless search of defendant’s live well fish container). 
 189. Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 259 (citations omitted). 
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Similar rationale is applicable to warrantless administrative inspections 
conducted by conservation agents. Missouri has enacted a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme aimed at preserving the fish and wildlife resources of the 
state.190 Regulations are prescribed for a wide variety of activities related to the 
taking, possession, sale, and transportation of fish and wildlife.191 Brian Mull 
explains the purpose of these regulations: “Fishing and game laws are nearly 
ubiquitous, and most states consider those regulations vital in order to preserve 
wildlife populations for current populations and future generations.”192 
Considering the citizens of Missouri granted the Conservation Commission with 
the exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the fish, forest, and wildlife 
resources of the state, the same holds true in Missouri.193 
Advancing the regulatory scheme related to fish and wildlife in Missouri 
would be nearly impossible without the ability for conservation agents to 
conduct warrantless administrative inspections. As the Maikhio court correctly 
recognized:  
[M]any of the regulations concern [the characteristics and number of fish]. A 
rule permitting a game warden to stop and to demand display of only those . . . 
who the warden reasonably suspects have violated a statute or regulation would 
seriously compromise . . . the state’s ability to accomplish its objective. 
Violations of these types are not apparent from an angler’s or hunter’s outward 
appearance or conduct.194 
Missouri regulations related to hunting and fishing also require close 
inspection for realistic enforcement.195 Furthermore, Missouri’s size, 
population, number of hunters and anglers, and the relatively small number of 
conservation agents create a situation necessitating warrantless regulatory 
inspections.196 
Section 252.100 of the Revised Statues of Missouri and title 3, section 10-
4.125 of the Missouri Code of Regulations read together provide an adequate 
substitute for a warrant, and place appropriate restraint on the discretion of 
conservation agents by limiting the time, place, and scope of inspections.197 The 
statute notifies hunters and anglers of who is authorized to conduct an inspection 
 
 190. See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10, Chapters 1–20 (2017). 
 191. See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10, Chapters 4–20 (2017). 
 192. Bryan M. Mull, The Hidden Cost of Rod and Rifle: Why State Fish and Game Laws Must 
be Amended in Order to Protect Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure in the Great Outdoors, 
42 U. BALT. L. REV. 801, 809 (2013). 
 193. See supra Part III. 
 194. Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 261. 
 195. See, e.g., MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-6.505 (2017) (establishing seasons, methods, and 
limits for taking black bass); MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-7.410 (2017) (prohibiting use of a shotgun 
with a capacity of more than three shells). 
 196. See supra Section VI.A.2. 
 197. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100.1 (2017); MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.125 (2017). 
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(authorized agents of the Conservation Commission, sheriffs, and marshalls), 
gives notice of the specific places or items which may be inspected without a 
warrant, and the locations or items where a warrant is specifically required.198 
The regulation limits the inspections to times when a person is possessing, 
taking, transporting, or using wildlife; and the scope of the inspection is limited 
to permits, wildlife, and devices or facilities used to take, possess, or transport 
wildlife; but only as permitted by section 252.100 of the Revised Missouri 
Statutes.199 
These facts demonstrate that warrantless administrative inspections by 
conservation agents of hunters, anglers, and others using fish and wildlife in 
Missouri pass constitutional muster under the administrative search exception. 
Haden and Israel contend the administrative search exception is not 
applicable to inspections conducted by game wardens or conservation agents 
because “a field check of a hunter or a stop of his vehicle is not searching a 
‘commercial premises’ at a fixed geographic location during regular business 
hours.”200 This is a narrow interpretation which goes beyond the Burger 
requirements by interpreting the “fixed time, place, and scope” requirement to 
be limited to these places. As Justice Scalia noted in City of Los Angeles 
California v. Patel, the Court may have only identified four industries as closely 
regulated, but lower courts have identified several more industries as closely 
regulated under the test announced by the Court.201 In one of these cases, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the warrantless stop and boarding of a salmon fishing boat 
in Puget Sound by an officer of the National Marine Fishery Service under the 
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.202 In this instance, 
the administrative inspection was clearly not conducted on “commercial 
premises” at a “fixed geographic location during regular business hours.” 
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court stated in Patel, “[h]istory is relevant 
when determining whether an industry is closely regulated,”203 as is the 
“duration of the regulatory tradition.”204 The origins of fish and wildlife 
regulation in Missouri is arguably rooted in regulating a commercial industry, 
“market hunting.”205 Missouri’s first game laws in the 1800s for the protection 
of wildlife were thought of as “fair trade practices” for market hunters, and 
ultimately were ineffective in managing the fish and wildlife resources of the 
 
 198. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100.1 (2017). 
 199. MO. REV. STAT. § 252.100.1 (2017); MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10-4.125 (2017). 
 200. Haden & Israel, supra note 2, at 92–93. 
 201. 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2460 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 
866, 871 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding warrantless inspections of commercial trucks are permissible and 
Missouri statutes permitting these inspections are “constitutional on their face”). 
 202. United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205, 1206 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 203. Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2455. 
 204. Id. at 2459 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 205. See supra Part II. 
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state.206 As wildlife populations declined, commercial harvest methods and sale 
of wildlife were abolished or strictly regulated.207 Today, wildlife regulations 
allow extremely limited commercialization by holders of sport permits, and 
business entities utilizing fish or wildlife as part of their enterprise are closely 
regulated.208 Based upon the historical uses and regulation of wildlife in 
Missouri, hunting, fishing, and other uses of wildlife are highly regulated 
activities which fall within the administrative inspection exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
As Bryan Mull correctly notes: “it appears fruitless to contend that the 
wardens’ suspicionless searches are unconstitutional. . . . [s]tate and lower 
federal courts have upheld the majority of administrative game warden 
searches.”209 Missouri has a rich history of protecting and conserving its fish and 
wildlife resources, and the citizens of the state have developed a regulatory 
framework that strongly favors protecting them.210 
Although history demonstrates a strong commitment to protecting 
Missouri’s fish and wildlife resources by the citizens of the state,211 this must be 
done without infringing on the Fourth Amendment rights of those who hunt, 
fish, and utilize the wildlife resources of the state. While an argument to the 
contrary can be made that there is a lower standard for interactions between 
conservation agents and hunters and anglers,212 the analysis indicates that the 
applicable laws and enforcement procedures exercised by conservation agents 
are within the traditional scope of police activities permitted by the Fourth 
Amendment.213 
The search authority of officers charged with enforcing fish and wildlife 
related regulations has not been challenged for over ninety years in Missouri,214 
and if a challenge occurs in the future, the courts will likely find searches and  
 
 
 
 
 
 206. See supra Part II. 
 207. See supra Part II. 
 208. See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 10, Chapters 4–10 (2017). 
 209. Mull, supra note 192, at 811. 
 210. See supra Part III. 
 211. See supra Parts II, III. 
 212. Haden & Israel, supra note 2, at 80. 
 213. See supra Part VI. 
 214. See State v. Bennett, 288 S.W. 50 (Mo. 1926). 
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seizures conducted by conservation agents do not offend the Fourth 
Amendment.215 
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